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Organised labor'sl most critical problem in the twentieth century
has been how to bring economic and political democracy to workers.
The extension of democracy for workers, however, cannot be
separated from the problem of democracy and human rights for
society as a whole. At various times, the needs of the general society
have been far more important than just workers' needs, especially
when countries have been plunged into the terror ofrightwing statesanctioned2 violence.
The two main institutions of organised labor in modem times
have been trade unions and political parties. Social movements,
however, have always provided the impetus for major (as opposed
to incremental) social and political changes that workers' unions and
parties may have helped initiate. In the first half of the twentieth
century, virtually every union and political breakthrough for workers
in industrialising countries involved leftwing 3 leaders and
organisations in some way, even if these initiatives at times were led
by mainstream unions and labor-oriented parties with moderate
policies and actions, and with leadership that did not include or only
marginally included the left.
While considerable research has been done on the relationship
between Ieftwing labor and rightwing violence for specific countries,
beyond the European context this is a generally unexplored subject
in broad comparative terms. 4 Even comparative labor history takes
us only so far, because all too often the comparison is with regimes
and labor movements that are relatively similar. This scholarship
generally separates the "labor world" into Asian and non-Asian
spheres. 5 Another focus, comparing national industrial relations
systems or comparing national cultural differences, is not enough
either, however useful these approaches have been up to the present.
Works in these particular areas, however, at least begin to connect
Asian-based and European-based labor, even though they often
emphasize institutional frameworks to the exclusion of labor
movements and these movements' interaction with political regimes. 6
We need to go beyond the usual "compare / contrast" framework
of comparative labor history and work toward a new type of
methodology, but one that does not necessarily exclude previous
ones.? As historians and social scientists, we cannot possibly find
new approaches without building on and giving due recognition to
earlier accomplishments. Certainly there are significant moves in
the direction of new "comparative" approaches, perhaps most evident
in scholarship that has been appearing in the journals International
Labor and Working-Class History and International Review ofSocial
History. Building a connection between comparative historical work
and broader theoretical possibilities requires a methodology that
extends much of the work that has been presented in these journals.
Given the limitations of time and space here, what follows is an
initial outline, with some hypotheses, of a work in progress.
I am proposing a new "global" framework for labor history that
will reveal currently hidden patterns and dynamics of-and questions
about - labor movements and labor institutions internationally,
especially in relation to political regimes. My specific subject - to
be researched in detail in the future - utilises a global framework
that focuses on specific strategic unions and industries in four
countries located in four regions of the "Pacific hemisphere"8
- Argentina, Australia, Japan, and the United States - during

the interwar period. 9 One common linkage is that each country was
the economic leader, in terms of GDP growth rates, in its particular
region (Argentina - southeastern; Australia - southwestern; Japannorthwestern; United States - northeastern) in the years preceding
this era.
Why specific unions and industries? We need to know how
workers organised at the worksite, or in particular protest settings
(strikes, rallies, community mobilisations, and so on). It is not enough
to know the general outcomes or the summaries made by top leaders.
For example, finding out the actual role ofthe left within a union or
workplace all too often requires analysis of day to day actions at
critical moments. \0 The link betweens these union and industrial
activities to larger political developments is the key to understanding
common global patterns. Why strategic unions and industries? A
strategic focus makes the research possible, narrowing the study to
those unions and industries (1) most important to the particular
country (examples would include, but not be limited to, mining for
Australia, meatpacking for Argentina, automobiles for the United
States, and shipbuilding for Japan); and (2) those most important in
comparative terms (examples would include, but not be limited to,
dock workers in Australia and Argentina, steelworkers in the United
States and Japan, and textile workers in all four countries).
The problem of "rightwing violence" is crucial for labor history
during this period for several reasons. First, political changes during
the interwar period created the explosive environment that led to the
first truly global war - World War II. Outside of Europe, how did
changing political regimes and violence associated with them impact
on the possibilities oflabor movement expansion or contraction, and
on democracy or repression for the larger society in these countries?
What role did the labor movement play in counteracting the state's
negative role where this existed, or in influencing the state to act in
positive (and nonviolent) ways? Second, how was violence, whether
from employers, non-employer associations, and / or the state, used
against the labor movement, and how did the labor movement
respond? To what extent can this violence be characterised as
"rightwing." Was the violence directed against labor confined to
workplace issues (such as widespread police and employer violence
against C.I.O. union organising efforts in the United States during
the 1930s; Jl or the police shootings during the Townsville
Meatworkers strike ofl918-1919 in Australia12)? Or did the violence
spread beyond the workplace to engulf the society at large (such as
Argentina's "La Semana Tnigica" massacres in 1919, directed
initially against workers but within days against immigrants and Jews
as well; 13 or the massive police repression against unions,
intellectuals, and political oppositionists accompanying the rise of
military influence in 1930s JapanI4)?
Comparing interwar regimes in these four countries reveals a
paradox. In economic terms, Australia and Argentina followed similar
paths of development. In the decades before World War I, both
countries had very high growth rates, high rates of immigration from
Europe, and had strong primary sector-based industries (meat and
meatpacking for Argentina, wool and mining for Australia, for
example). While both were industrialising, they were not doing
so at the same pace as North America and Western Europe.
Japan and the United States, on the other hand, were
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industrialised nations during the interwar years, even though the U.S.
was far ahead in many sectors. By the mid-1930s, however, they
were equals in a few strategic industries such as shipbuilding. The
U.S. had a strong primary sector, but its manufacturing capability
became the most important strategic part ofits economy by this time.
Japan's weak primary sector forced it to concentrate on manufacturing
capacity in order to successfully compete with Western powers.
Politically, however, the United States and Australia had far more
in common with each other than they did with either Japan or
Argentina. Both had elected systems of government, with complete
civilian oversight of the military. In contrast, Japan had an unstable
parliamentary system without sufficient control over the country's
army and navy, who saw themselves as owing primary loyalty to the
Japanese emperor. Argentina's military also did not view itself as
subject solely to civilian elected authority. In 1930, the Argentine
military overthrew the (liberal) Radical Party government of
Yrigoyen, remaining in power for over a decade, even though nominal
and corrupt elections of civilians were held until it assumed total
control from 1943 to 1945.'5 Japan experienced a more gradual
military "coup", first evident in 1931 when the Kwangtung Army in
China defied Prime Minister Inukai by invading and occupying all
of Manchuria, followed by numerous assassination attempts against
leading elected officials in Japan. After Army officers finally
assassinated Inukai in 1932, the military had virtual independence
from and veto power over any civilian government. 16
Violence against labor in Japan and Argentina during the 1930s
must take full consideration of these political developments and the
unique role of the military. In contrast, violence against labor in
Australia and the United States was overwhelmingly the product of
local police and locally elected or appointed officials, rather than
the national or state governments. Australian workers in particular
were least subjected to violence. On the other hand, workers in certain
regions and industries in both the United States and Australia
experienced a disproportionate level of violence. Trying to organise
U.S. Southern workers during this entire period did not differ much
from attempting to unionise Japanese workers generally, because of
the complete disregard for law and human rights by Southern
government authorities and employers.
Levels of violence, then, need to be categorised. Low levels
involved temporary arrests and the application of standard (rather
than extraordinary) legal prohibitions. This type of violence was often
more psychological than physical. When Australian workers and
unions were subjected to any form of violence during this period it
rarely if ever went beyond this level, in large part because of the
institutional and legal protections of the compulsory arbitration
system and the political power ofthe Australian Labor Party (A.L.P.).
American workers and unions often faced more severe forms of
violence until the end of the 1930s when the National Labor Relations
Act (N.L.R.A.) and positive court rulings backing up the Act began
to have a moderating effect on many employers and local government
officials. By the 1930s, the generally pro-labor administration of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and widespread labor influence in a
revitalised Democratic Party at local, state, and national levels further
assisted labor's advance. I?
Medium levels of violence involved police attacks, including
beatings and nonlethal shootings; long-term arrests; severe legal
restrictions on activities; outright bans on labor activity and
organisation bans; surveillance and use of agents provocateurs; and
mobilisation of rightwing mobs. Throughout most of the interwar
period, this level of violence directed against labor was common in
many parts of the United States. The consolidation of union
power and legitimacy during World War II, with the full support
of the Roosevelt administration, put an end to much of this

violence directed at labor, except in the South, which was a region
with laws and mores quite different from much of the rest of the
United States. Violence against labor in the South, too, cannot be
understood unless it is seen in relation to racial segregation and
violence against African Americans, something endorsed by virtually
every leading government official in that region until the advances
won by the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. In the
American South, the cause of a multiracial labor movement has
always been directly tied to the fate ofAfrican Americans as a whole. IS
In Japan, on the other hand, authorities relied heavily on police
with wide discretionary powers to enforce a "medium" level of
violence against workers, unions, and leftwing political parties. As
enforcers of political orthodoxy, these Japanese authorities tended
to focus mainly on leftwing union and political organisations, while
not harassing more moderate (and eventually conservative) union
formations, such as the Sodomei labor federation. 19 Argentine
authorities were not as extreme as their Japanese counterparts,
especially in the 1920s after the 1919-22 strike wave and before
military rule that commenced in 1930. 20 Both the Japanese and
Argentine cases, however, reveal another dynamic behind interwar
labor movements: nationalist anti-left unions emerged by the late
1930s that supplanted the power of the leftwing organisations. In
Japan this policy was ruthlessly pursued through state actions and
dissolution of existing independent unions. In Argentina, on the other
hand, a populist labor movement emerged that eventually became
the base of Juan Peron, a former military officer who turned on the
military authorities and later retained the presidency through
legitimate elections. 21
High levels of violence against labor have included killings, either
as individual assassinations or mass killings; mass arrests without
due process; widespread attacks on working class communities; total
bans on any labor activities, punishable by arrest, physical abuse
(torture), and killing; rightwing mobilisation of mobs to carrying
out lethal attacks; use of the military in addition to the police; and
the elimination of all legal rights. Japanese labor seems to have been
most subjected to these extreme forms of violence, in contrast to
Australian labor during this time which rarely if ever experienced
this level of abuse. The problem for understanding violence against
labor in Japan, however, is that we don't know in detail the exact
extent of it. When some one thousand trade unionists and intellectuals
were arrested en masse after passage of the Universal Manhood
Suffrage Act in 1926 (but preceded by earlier police powers as well),
what happened to them while incarcerated?22 How did this affect
families, other organisers, and the labor organisations themselves?
The same could be said for the late 1930s, when independent trade
unions were disbanded by the state and the government-run Sanpo
labor organisation replaced them. These type of questions are readily
asked when we confront the contemporary realities oflabor activists
in China, South Korea, or Indonesia, but labor historians have not
addressed these issues as directly when discussing the Japanese
movement during the interwar periodY
Overall, patterns of violence against labor have been uneven,
making it difficult to draw national generalisations for the whole
period. For all four countries, levels of violence need to be considered
in terms of (I) specific unions, especially those tied to the left; (2)
specific political organisations and parties; (3) specific industrial
sectors and workers within them; (4) specific regions or locales,
especially those more likely to experience violence against labor;
(5) years within the interwar period (the 1920s, for example, appear
less violent in Japan under "Taisho Democracy" and Argentina under
the elected Radical Party governments than the militarydominated decade of the 1930s); (6) general popular support
for or opposition to labor repression / labor advancement.

One peculiar part of the puzzle, when considering the labor
movement in all four countries, is the failure of the labor movement
politically in Australia and in trade union terms in Argentina and
Japan during the 1930s, in contrast to the labor movement's
spectacular union organising and political alliance-building successes
in the United States during this decade. Part of the solution may be
to compare union densities and activity in each country during this
decade, because these highlight the centrality of political regimes in
determining the relative strength or weakness of the labor movement.
All four countries suffered from the worldwide depression. At
the national level, both Japan and the United States introduced major
government spending programs, including substantial militaryrelated projects. Japan preceded the U.S. in major military spending
during the 1930s, but President Franklin D. Roosevelt soon brought
the U.S. into a competitive position in this area, with naval
shipbuilding initially leading the way, and later superseded by military
aircraft production by the late 1930s. 24 Japanese trade union
membership climbed during the 1930s, but did so at a very slow
pace and never approached the American figure. Economic conditions
and Keynesian-type government spending therefore do not explain
union expansion or contraction.
The evidence points to political rather than economic factors as
the driving force behind labor strength. Japan's union density was
only 8 percent of the industrial workforce in its prewar peak (1936),
with union membership in all sectors totalling 420,000. During World
War II, union membership in unions not controlled by the dropped
to zero.25 In 1946, one year after the end of World War II and
authoritarian government, Japan's union density reached 41 percent,
with 4,926,000 union members, a dramatic statement about the role
of political regimes in hindering or assistance the labor movement. 26
In contrast, U.S. union density in 1930, one of the lowest points for
membership in the first half of the twentieth century, was just 11.6
percent of nonagricultural workers. President Herbert Hoover and a
Republican-controlled Congress pushed through "balanced budgets,"
refused to fund any government relief for the unemployed, and
promoted the interests of big business at the expense oflabor. Eight
years later (1938), union membership had risen to 27.5 percent, and
by 1945 had reached an all-time high of35.5 percent. 27 This growth
occurred under President Roosevelt's pro-labor Democratic
administration, which carried out government spending policies that
paralleled those of the Japanese governments of the same years.
Argentina's historical level of union strength is more difficult to
assess because much of the literature does not even address the
question of union density.28 Strike activity, however, can be used as
an alternative indicator. Argentina's biggest strike wave before the
1940s occurred between 1919 and 1922. In Buenos Aires alone, which
would have been the main, but not only, centre of labor activity,
there were 367 strikes with 308,967 workers participating. By 1923,
the labor movement had been contained, with only 4,737 workers
joining in 114 strikes in the city.29 Nationally, Shipley calculates that
19,181 workers took part in 93 strikes (a figure at odds with the
larger number of strikes in Buenos Aires, which is an indicator of
the lack of accuracy in strike statistics for Argentina's interwar period.
By 1928, strikes rose to 135, with 73,918 strikers, and then fell to
127 strikes, with 38, 505 strikers, in 1930, the year of the military
coup d' etat. 30 During the 1930s, unions stagnated, with only 43 strikes
and 4,622 strikers in 1931, and 105 strikes with 34,562 strikers in
1932.3' Labor had virtually no power politically and had been
weakened in terms of trade union membership and impact. Its fortunes
would not be reversed until the early 1940s, when meatpackers,
workers from the nation's leading industrial sector, united
behind Juan Peron to forge a new labor populism that would
overthrow military and conservative control of the

government. Again, the political regime would make the difference.
As Berquist notes, the predominance of a moderate and ineffective
labor federation, the Confederacion General de Trabajadores (C.G.T.)
stifled a mil itant response to repressive government measures against
labor.32
This pattern also occurred in Japan, where the moderate and
increasingly conservative and anticommunist Sodomei federation
of unions tried to accommodate the rightwing governments of the
1930s. As in Argentina, communist-led unions were targeted and
suppressed by the government. Large argues that Sodomei also was
accepted by many Japanese workers, especially with the rise of
ultranationalism in support of Japanese aggression against China.
Ultranationalism, however, can spread more easily when police are
actively used to repress and terrorise those who oppose it, especially
in working class movements.
In the United States, the union movement shifted to the left during
these years, but never became a socialist-oriented labor movement.
The industrial unions that split away from the American Federation
of Labor (A.F.L.) to form what eventually became the Congress of
Industrial Organisations (C.I.O.) were led by John L. Lewis, head of
the United Mine Workers (U.M.W.), a man who had become
notorious in his own union for his authoritarianism and use of thugs
to deliver discipline to his factional enemies. When Lewis assumed
leadership of the C.I.O., however, he changed into a different person,
hiring socialists and communists as advisers and organisers because
he knew they would work the hardest and produce the best results.
Leftwing socialists led C.I.O. unions in auto, shipbuilding, and men's
clothing, while communists came to lead C.I.O. unions in longshore
(dock workers), electrical production, metal mining and smelting,
and meatpacking. The most important organising breakthroughs of
the decade - on the San Francisco docks in 1934 and the Flint GM
sitdown of 1937 - were led by communists like Harry Bridges (who
always denied his affiliation) and men like Wyndham Mortimer (who
didn't deny it). Only very late in the 1930s did the C.I.O. begin to
accommodate the mainstream Democratic Party, and in the process
move to the right. Attacks on communists, however, did not become
a major feature of the union movement until the mid- to late-1940s,
when the political barrage from anti-union Republicans in Congress
grew. By the late 1940s, the RepUblicans controlled Congress, even
though Democrat Harry S. Truman was president, and this change
made it possible for a full-scale legislative and investigative assault
on the labor movement, especially its leftwing. In response, the C.I.O.
unions expelled those unions who had communists among their
leadership, and moved more and more to the right. As this happened,
mainstream unions lost the possibility of political independence and
a genuine voice on behalf of the working class, and instead became
little more than advocates for improved workplace conditions. 33
In Argentina and Japan during the interwar period, leftwing labor
led by anarchists, syndicalists, and finally communists had been
unable to make longterm headway, either in trade union or political
terms, in large part because of the sharp rise of rightwing statesponsored violence during the 1930s. In the United States, a prolabor administration at the federal government level assisted the
advancement of a new industrial union movement that included
significant numbers of leftwing leaders and organisers. This
administration and its Democratic majority in Congress also acted
to restrict rightwing violence against labor, whether this violence
came from local government officials and police or from employers,
by instituting reform legislation and agencies that would provide
alternatives to strikes and that would guarantee workers' rights to
organise.
Australia appears to be quite different than these other
three countries. In Australia, union density was among the

highest in the world, reaching 53.3 percent by 1920. Membership
rose to 56 percent by 1929, then feU to a low of 42.6 percent in
1934, still far above any of the other three countries for any time in
their history. Ten years later, in 1944, membership had rebounded to
54.2 percent and remained in this general percentage for three and a
half decades. 34 The difference between Australia and these other
countries, in terms of trade union security, has been the compulsory
arbitration system and the requirement that unions are registered by
the state (rather than chosen by workers and / or agreed to by
employers) under this system. Australia's political regimes, until very
recently, have accepted this system since it began in the early part of
the twentieth century, thereby creating a protective waU (through
the industrial courts and legal precedents) around trade unions.
Further supporting the advance of labor has been the Australian
Labor Party, which has acted on behalf of trade union interests, but
has also provided an integral political linked for unions. This labor
strength, however, has not been leftwing in character, however
progressive numerous reforms over the century have been. The
A.L.P. 's laborism has been at the expense of leftwing labor and a
socialist agenda. In times past it has also supported racism and
imperialism at the expense of working class internationalism.
At the same time, leftwing activists have been at the core of
Australian labor's advance. The conscience of Australian labor has
more often come from its leftwing unions, such as the Waterside
Workers Federation (opposing World War I conscription promoted
by a Labor government) and the Miners' Federation (opposing
postwar austerity under a Labor government). The ideals and direct
action practices of the Australian branch of the LW. W. (International
Workers of the World) have also inspired rank-and-file activists in
many conservative unions, including the powerful Australian Workers
Union (A.W.U.).35 The Australian movement seemed to have every
advantage in the interwar period, compared to the labor movements
in Japan, Argentina, and even the United States. Union density was
high, far higher than even the United States in the 1930s, labor had
its own political party and had held power at both the state and federal
levels, and rightwing violence against labor was at one of the lowest
levels in the entire world.
Why, then, did the Australian labor movement fail to advance in
union terms - at least nationally - during the Great Depression?
Why did its political wing fail to retain national power under the
Scullin Labor government, and why did Labor not return to national
power again until World War II? When we look only at Australia,
the answer to these questions may appear straightforward - the power
of the Bank of England over Australia's national loan repayments
and implications for budget deficits; the initial split in the A.L.P. 's
ranks, led by Lang; betrayal by Treasurer Joe Lyons and the creation
of the United Australia Party; Scullins's general lack ofleadership;
and so on. The solution is not so obvious, however, when viewed
from a comparative - and especially global - perspective: why did
Australian labor fail at such a critical moment when so much seemed
to be in its favour?
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